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UK	financial	power	after	Brexit:	understanding	the
country’s	external	balance	sheets
Mona	Ali	argues	that	the	UK’s	financial	position	is	reflected	in	its	‘balance	of	payment’	dynamics.
Here	she	compares	the	UK’s	external	balance	sheets	with	those	of	the	US,	and	explores	the	potential
implications	of	Brexit	for	the	country’s	politico-economic	future.	She	explains	why	Brexit	is	likely	to
leave	the	economy	adrift	for	quite	some	time.
Few	nations	have	been	as	obsessed	with	their	status	in	the	world	as	Great	Britain.	Not	surprisingly,
the	Government	Statement	at	Chequers	begins	with	the	words	that	with	its	departure	from	the	EU,	the
UK	will	‘begin	to	chart	a	new	course	in	the	world.’	But	can	it?	In	recent	research,	I	assess	Britain’s
macroeconomic	resilience	and	economic	power	by	examining	its	external	balance	sheets.	As	sovereign	power	only
exists	relative	to	that	of	other	countries,	I	examine	the	UK’s	balance	of	payments	(BoP)	against	those	of	the	US.
The	flexibility	of	a	nation’s	external	balance	sheets	is	an	outcome	of	its	monetary	power.	Powerful	currencies	enable
softer	budget	constraints.	The	US,	issuer	of	the	world’s	predominant	currency,	finances	its	deficits	by	selling	dollar-
denominated	securities	to	the	rest	of	the	world,	and	so	bypasses	the	onerous	process	of	deficit-reduction—which
may	involve	devaluation,	spending	cutbacks,	and	trade	protectionism.	But	BoP	flexibility	is	not	just	a	matter	of
monetary	power.	It	could	also	be	the	outcome	of	a	sovereign	state’s	standing	in	the	global	régime.
While	sterling	has	long	lost	its	imperial	reign	as	the	‘world’s	money’,	as	a	global	financial	hub	Britain	draws	in
substantial	foreign	capital	(6%	of	GDP	in	2016).	This	continued	access	to	external	financing	along	with	income
generated	from	foreign	investment	has	allowed	the	country	to	postpone	external	deficit	reduction.	Britain’s	balance
sheets	also	exhibit	some	of	the	same	features	associated	with	American	‘exorbitant	privilege’—the	capacity	to	run
external	deficits	without	deleterious	consequences.	These	more	subtle	characteristics	that	lend	themselves	to	BoP
stability	include:	compositional	differences	in	a	nation’s	foreign	assets	versus	foreign	liabilities,	so	that	own-currency
depreciation	boosts	the	aggregate	value	of	foreign	assets;	positive	net	foreign	income	earnings	(despite	a	much
larger	stock	of	foreign	liabilities	than	assets);	and	a	higher	rate	of	return	on	foreign	assets	compared	to	foreign
liabilities.
The	transatlantic	economies	occupy	the	pinnacle	of	global	financial	power.	Viewing	the	Anglo-American	axis	through
Britain’s	external	balance	sheets,	reveals	the	US	as	the	top	destination	for	foreign	investment	by	UK	residents:
almost	a	quarter	of	all	UK	foreign	assets	are	housed	in	the	US.	The	US	holds	about	26%	of	all	foreign-owned	assets
in	the	UK.	In	financial	services,	US	residents	own	almost	half	of	all	foreign-owned	domestic	UK	assets.
Compared	to	the	US,	however,	UK	external	balance	sheets	are	disproportionately	much	larger	and	more	volatile.	At
their	peak	in	2014,	US	foreign	assets	amounted	to	143%	of	GDP.	In	contrast,	at	their	apex	in	2008,	UK	foreign
assets	and	liabilities	each	topped	more	than	700%	of	GDP.
Britain’s	post-war	current	account	deficits	have	largely	been	shaped	by	its	manufacturing	goods	deficit.	More	recently
though,	foreign	income	receipts	have	played	a	larger	role.	In	2013,	the	UK	current	account	deficit	reached	an	all-time
high	of	almost	7%	of	GDP	driven	by	a	sharp	dive	in	net	foreign	income	receipts.	Right	after	the	Brexit	referendum	in
June	2016,	sterling	dived	to	a	30-year	low	against	the	dollar.	In	July	2016,	the	Bank	of	England	declared	the	UK
current	account	deficit	one	of	the	five	‘main	risks’	threatening	macroeconomic	stability.
The	reemergence	of	the	BoP	as	a	policy	concern	marks	a	noticeable	shift.	While	the	BoP	concern	had	dogged	much
of	postwar	British	economic	policy,	as	ideational	perspectives	regarding	Britain’s	place	in	the	international	economic
order	evolved,	so	did	conceptualisations	of	the	country’s	external	budget	constraint.	By	the	1990s,	current	account
deficits	were	no	longer	considered	deleterious.	Transatlantic	policymakers	embraced	a	laissez-faire	stance:	so	long
as	they	were	financed	by	capital	inflows,	trade	deficits	were	deemed	unproblematic.	The	next	decade	witnessed	a
dramatic	increase	in	US	and	UK	trade	deficits.
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In	hindsight,	a	consequence	of	the	economics	literature	describing	these	‘global	imbalances’	was	to	shift	focus	away
from	the	trade,	services,	and	income	flows	(known	as	the	current	account)	towards	asset	stocks.	Particularly
highlighted	here	were	the	considerable	impact	of	valuation	effects	(changes	in	currency	and	asset	prices)	on	a
country’s	stocks	of	external	assets	and	liabilities.	Such	valuation	losses	from	dollar	appreciation	following	the	2008
crisis	have	been	referred	to	as	‘exorbitant	duty’	or	the	underbelly	of	exorbitant	privilege.
For	some,	valuation	losses	amount	to	wealth	transfers	out	of	the	US.	Others	broadened	this	‘wealth	transfer’	thesis
to	argue	that	valuation	losses	amounted	to	declining	sovereign	monetary	power.	From	this	reductive	perspective,	an
improvement	in	valuation	gains	signals	strengthened	sovereignty.	In	2016,	valuation	gains	from	sterling	depreciation
inflated	UK	foreign	assets	spectacularly	reversing	the	UK’s	net	foreign	asset	position	(foreign	assets	–	foreign
liabilities)	from	18%	to	24%	of	GDP.	In	theory,	these	upward	asset	revaluations	(via	the	wealth	effect)	may	partially
explain	why	the	UK	economy	performed	above	expectations	despite	post-Brexit	uncertainty.	But	economic	growth
the	following	year	was	only	1.8%,	the	lowest	it	had	been	in	half	a	decade.
Financial	globalization—where	the	profit-seeking	activities	of	transnational	firms	distort	GDP	and	trade	data—
requires	treating	nation-based	statistics	with	some	skepticism.	Given	the	complexity	and	uncertainty	involved,
microanalyses	that	focus	on	just	one	measure	of	the	BoP	(such	as	valuation	effects)	are	bound	to	misrepresent.
Preferred	instead	are	more	multi-faceted	approaches	to	interpreting	BoP	stability	which	are	framed	by	political-
economic	considerations	such	as	a	country’s	place	in	the	international	economic	order.
So,	just	how	resilient	are	the	UK	balance	sheets	in	the	face	of	external	shocks?	Brexit	itself	will	manifest	as	a
negative	supply	shock.	Britain’s	trade	with	the	EU	constitutes	almost	half	of	its	total	foreign	trade,	but	the	UK
currently	stands	to	lose	the	many	advantages	of	participation	in	the	single	market.	These	include	passporting	rights
as	well	as	economies	of	scale	reaped	by	British	firms	from	their	Europe-wide	networks.	Recall	that	for	some	political
economists,	adjustment	mechanisms	include	retractions	in	spending,	currency	devaluation,	and	trade	controls.	The
lead	up	to	Brexit	indicates	that	Britain’s	capacity	to	delay	dealing	with	its	external	deficit	has	diminished.	Both
devaluation	and	spending	cut-backs—in	fact,	an	entire	decade	of	austerity	under	the	Conservatives—have	come	to
pass.	Brexit	itself,	with	its	restrictions	on	the	free	movement	of	labour	and	goods,	will	represent	the	most	draconian	of
BoP	adjustment	mechanisms.
The	underlying	conditions—sectoral	imbalances,	stagnant	gross	capital	formation,	dismal	wage	and	productivity
gains,	household	indebtedness,	and	worsening	inequality—in	the	British	economy	are	unfavourable.	The
government’s	response	(also	evident	in	the	Chequers	statement)	has	been	to	safeguard	the	finance	and	related
professional	services	(FRPS)	sector	by	‘provid[ing]	regulatory	flexibility	where	it	matters	most	for	the	UK’s	services-
based	economy.’
Crafting	the	City	of	London	as	a	playground	for	global	finance	has	been	a	long-standing	vision	of	the	British
establishment.	The	FRPS	does	generate	more	net	exports	(around	4.5%	of	GDP)	than	all	other	trade	surplus	sectors
combined.	However,	given	that	the	FRPS	sector	comprises	just	11%	of	UK	GDP	and	only	7%	of	UK	employment,
pinning	British	prosperity	to	the	continued	success	of	FRPS	is	a	mistake.	Needed	instead	are	industrial	policies	that
promote	broad-based	wage	and	employment	growth	along	with	BoP	stability.	If	not,	Brexit,	coupled	with	directionless
economic	policy,	will	leave	the	British	economy	adrift	for	quite	some	time.
The	above	draws	on	the	author’s	published	work	in	the	International	Review	of	Applied	Economics,	it	originally
appeared	at	our	sister	site,	British	Politics	and	Policy.	It	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	LSE	Brexit
or	the	London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	Pixabay	(Public	Domain).
Mona	Ali	is	Associate	Professor	in	the	Department	of	Economics,	State	University	of	New	York	at	New	Paltz.
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